Page 103 Klaus talks about the geopolitical reset, he states that geopolitics and pandemics basically go hand in hand, and in keeping with his viewpoint he tell us:
“… the chaotic end of multilateralism, a vacuum of global governance and the rise of various forms of nationalism make it more difficult to deal with the outbreak.”(103).
This is curious considering the UN/WHO basically quarter-backed the entire global response which our leaders followed without question.
Klaus wants global governance and to him, nationalism is a problem.
The article he sites Why Nationalism Works: And Why It Isn’t Going Away gives us a rundown of the good the bad and ugly of nationalism throughout the ages.
One thing is clear, if a government or group feel they are being undermined either through external influence or internal policies that don’t foster inclusion there will be problems.
Is the solution Global Governance?
Klaus tells us:
“geopolitical fault lines that divide societies spur many leaders to focus on national responses — a situation that constrains collective effectiveness and reduces the ability to eradicate the pandemic.”(103)
The problem is as is stated in the nationalism article is “In both the developed and the developing world, nationalism is here to stay.
There is currently no other principle on which to base the international state system.” So what does Klaus expect?
We are constrained by the system we are currently in.
Does Klaus expect all the nations of the world to adhere to the concept of Universtalistic Cosmopolitanism?
Of course he does, that’s just another name for globalism and all it entails, but again, and the article points out:
“… it is unclear if transnational institutions such as the European Union will ever be able to assume the core functions of national governments, including welfare and defense, which would allow them to gain popular legitimacy.”
It’s nice to think in rosy terms like universalistic cosmopolitanism.
It sounds great doesn’t it? The problem is for that to happen, for people to be “citizens of the world” that means someone somewhere is at the top of the food chain, it means consolidation of power on a world-wide scale, a country’s leader would be subservient to it, i.e. world government.
That would also mean on some level universality of standards of all kinds, including legal, cultural, and moral.
Sounds a lot like Marx, doesn’t it with his mantra of
Workers of the World Unite
The question then becomes who’s morals, culture and laws?
Maybe it’s mine, but it might not be, and how can that be reconciled?
Apparently that isn’t something to worry about because we need to wrap our heads around the problem of “various forms of rampant nationalism [that] are taking the place of order and cooperation.” (104) and the US and China fighting for dominance.
Depending on your beliefs, you will either see the decline of the US in relation to China as either a good or a bad thing.
To Klaus, that isn’t really the problem, the problem is international volatility while this drama plays out.
He states:
“The 21st century will most likely be an era devoid of an absolute hegemon during which no one power gains absolute dominance — as a result, power, and influence will be redistributed chaotically and in some cases grudgingly.”(104)
I am sure to many a world where the influence of the US is minimized or eliminated would be a joyous occasion.
The assumption Klaus is making of course is that someone needs to be in charge, either the US or China.
The thought of nations working to better themselves without the determent of others seems to be lacking in Klaus’ vision of the future.
To him, “retrenchment, fragmentation, anger and parochialism will increasingly define our global landscape, making it less intelligible and more disorderly.”(105)
Given the history of the world, it could be possible, but given that today is a vastly different world than when colonialism took place, I think it highly unlikely.
Instead, wouldn’t it be more possible that each individual nation took up relationships that were in their best interest, or mutual benefit instead of some of the exploitation that is currently going on?
Not to mention the UN would still exist, so would the IMF, WHO and GATT so what exactly would be the disorder?
But don’t worry Klaus is going review for us “four main issues that will become more prevalent in the post-pandemic era and that conflate with each other: the erosion of globalization, the absence of global governance, the increasing rivalry between the US and China, and the fate of fragile and failing states.”(105)
Klaus tells us that globalization “… has succeeded in lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty…”(105).
I always thought it was capitalism that did that, but I guess that’s just splitting hairs, but we are all aware that it isn’t communism.
Another thing he tells us is that globalization is on the wane while:
“… the political and societal backlash against globalization relentlessly gained strength.”(106)
I’ve never been a fan of globalization.
By its very nature it removes jobs from a local economy, which in turn destroys towns and sometimes families.
Yes, it potentially creates more jobs than it removes, but I think most people care about the micro instead of the macro when it comes to their personal situation.
Hypocritically everyone still wants to pay 5 dollars for a shirt and the only way that happens is with globalization, because without it everyone is going to pay 40, so it’s complicated and solutions are not entirely obvious.
One thing that globalization has done because of the way its been implemented is create:
“…populist and right-wing parties… when they come into power, often retreat into nationalism and promote an isolationist agenda — two notions antithetical to globalization.” (106)
This then creates what Dani Rodrik calls the globalization trilemma framework.
In his book, The Globalization Paradox Rodrik tells us that by the 90s:
“… In the 1980s and 1990s by a more ambitious agenda of economic liberalization and deep integration—an effort to establish what we may call hyper-globalization. Trade agreements now extended beyond their traditional focus on import restrictions and impinged on domestic policies; controls on international capital markets were removed; and developing nations came under severe pressure to open their markets to foreign trade and investment. In effect, economic globalization became an end in itself.”(The Globalization Paradox)
According to Rodrik, globalization was pushed beyond its limits and “financial globalization ended up promulgating instability rather than higher investment and rapid growth. Within countries, globalization generated inequality and insecurity instead of lifting all boats."(The Globalization Paradox)
This appears to be what we are experiencing currently and the levels of unrest when world leaders have summits to discuss the economy.
Rodrik has an alternative view:
“First, markets and governments are complements, not substitutes. If you want more and better markets, you have to have more (and better) governance. Markets work best not where states are weakest, but where they are strong. Second, capitalism does not come with a unique model. Economic prosperity and stability can be achieved through different combinations of institutional arrangements in labor markets, finance, corporate governance, social welfare, and other areas. Nations are likely to—and indeed are entitled to—make varying choices among these arrangements depending on their needs and values.”(The Globalization Paradox)
These issues are the globalization paradox that is defined by
“we cannot simultaneously pursue democracy, national determination, and economic globalization. If we want to push globalization further, we have to give up either the nation state or democratic politics. If we want to maintain and deepen democracy, we have to choose between the nation state and international economic integration. And if we want to keep the nation state and self-determination, we have to choose between deepening democracy and deepening globalization. Our troubles have their roots in our reluctance to face up to these ineluctable choices.(The Globalization Paradox)
As Klaus points out, the EU is a “proxy for globalization”. (107) As Klaus points out:
“combining economic integration… with democracy implies that the important decisions have to be made at a supranational level, which somehow weakens the sovereignty of the nation state.” (107)
One need look no further than England’s Brexit, but if we bring it closer to home, imagine owning a house and you live in it with your family and then the city says they are the arbiters of any and all decisions within the household.
How much resentment would you have when their decisions impede, or outright stops, your ability to do anything you believe is required to do in your house?
No one would stand for that, yet on a country level it seems acceptable given globalization.
Something Klaus doesn’t mention regarding Rodrik’s book, which I think is telling, is that Rodrik calls for something called smart globalization, not maximum globalization.
To Rodrik, a strong nation will make the global economy better
“Even though it is possible to advance both democracy and globalization, the trilemma suggests this requires the creation of a global political community that is vastly more ambitious than anything we have seen to date or are likely to experience soon. It would call for global rule making by democracy, supported by accountability mechanisms that go far beyond what we have at present. Democratic global governance of this sort is a chimera. There are too many differences among nation states, I shall argue, for their needs and preferences to be accommodated within common rules and institutions. Whatever global governance we can muster will support only a limited version of economic globalization. The great diversity that marks our current world renders hyper-globalization incompatible with democracy. So we have to make some choices. Let me be clear about mine: democracy and national determination should trump hyper-globalization. Democracies have the right to protect their social arrangements, and when this right clashes with the requirements of the global economy, it is the latter that should give way. You might think that this principle would be the end of globalization. Not so. I hope to convince you by the end of this book that reempowering national democracies will in fact place the world economy on a safer, healthier footing. And therein lies the ultimate paradox of globalization. A thin layer of international rules that leaves substantial room for maneuver by national governments is a better globalization. It can address globalization’s ills while preserving its substantial economic benefits. We need smart globalization, not maximum globalization.”(The Global Paradox)
Further to this point, like anything there are positives and negatives with everything, the problem becomes when do we decide that the negatives outweigh the positives?
Globalization has done a lot of good, and a lot of bad, but as Rodrik states:
“Economists and policy advisers have exhibited myopia far too long toward the tensions and frailties that economic globalization generates. They have attributed every roadblock along the way to ignorance or, worse still, self-interested lobbying by protectionists of all kinds. They have paid insufficient attention to the legitimate clash among competing values and ideals that the single-minded pursuit of globalization accentuates. They have overlooked the link between well functioning markets and purposeful state action. Their prescriptions have correspondingly done more harm than good at times. And they have missed countless opportunities to deploy the tools of their trade to better effect.” (The Globalization Paradox)
If economists and leaders and everyone else would just admit this to the disgruntled public, I think a lot of the anger and resentment that many people feel will disappear when they feel vindicated that a policy created did more harm than good.
In many instances, it seems like governments double down on bad ideas and decisions just to prove to themselves and others that they didn’t make a mistake.
As Rodrik points out:
“The problem is not that economists are high priests of free market fundamentalism, but that they suffer from the same heuristic biases as regular people. They tend to exhibit groupthink and overconfidence, relying excessively on those pieces of evidence that support their preferred narrative of the moment, while dismissing others that don’t fit as neatly. They follow fads and fashion, promoting different sets of ideas at different times. They place too much weight on recent experience and too little weight on more distant history. They tend to over-focus on remedies that will address the last crisis, while paying insufficient attention to tensions that may result in the next. They tend to attribute dissenting views to ignorance or self-interest rather than genuine differences in evaluating the underlying circumstances. They are clannish, drawing a big distinction between who’s in and who’s out (i.e., card-carrying members of the profession versus the rest). As with all possessors of specialized knowledge, they tend to get arrogant when outsiders encroach upon their field. In other words, economists are human. They behave as humans do—not as the fictional hyperrational, social welfare–maximizing planners that their own models,” (The Globalization Paradox)
One has to wonder why Klaus chose not to mention these important aspects of the book when he quotes Rodrik regarding the trillema that:
“… two can effectively co-exist at any given time.”(107)
The reason he doesn’t is because Klaus believes, or at least gives the impression that the of global governance he envisages is:
“… straightforward delegation of national powers to international technocrats. It involves autonomous regulatory agencies charged with solving what are essentially regarded as ‘technical’ problems arising from uncoordinated decision making in the global economy.” (The Globalization Paradox)
The thing I find interesting about Rodrik’s position is that is seems completely reasonable.
It’s neither protectionist nor globalist. In a word, it’s nuanced.
It’s so reasonable, at least to me, that when Roderik quotes others in his book, it is very clear they believe in Klaus’ vision of global governance.
Anne-Marie Slaughter believes transnational networks “… can perform governance functions even when they are not constituted as intergovernmental organizations or formally institutionalized.”(The Globalization Paradox).
So, they’ll just do it because they can?
Seems like wheeling and dealing behind the corridors of power, doesn’t it?
Another one, by John Ruggie:
He believes that these trans-national networks have created imbalances in “the traditional model of governance of nation states.”(The Globalization Paradox)
So, according to him, there needs to basically a public, private partnership to increase corporate social responsibility:
“a multilateralism that actively embraces the potential contributions to global social organization by civil society and corporate actors.” These actors can advance new global norms—on human rights, labor practices, health, anti-corruption, and environmental stewardship—and then enshrine them in the operations of large international corporations and policies of national governments.” (The Globalization Paradox)
Sound familiar?
This is what Klaus has been advocating for and what corporations around the world seem to be jumping on this bandwagon, it’s ESG, or environmental, social, and governance which are three pillars of stakeholder captialism Which rolls up into public-private partnerships, where corporations will either take over, or be the exclusive arbiter of specific services on governments’ behalf.
In all the talk about this, I’ve seen no one talk about accountability, but even if all of those issues are sorted out, we still have the issue of 7.9 billion people in a 195 countries. How is this going to be handled?
Amartya Sen uses identity politics to tell us:
“it is quite misleading to think of ourselves as bound by a single, unchanging identity ethnic, religious, or national—with which we are born. Each one of us has multiple identities, based on our profession, gender, occupation, class, political leanings, hobbies and interests, sports teams we support, and so on. These identities do not come at the expense of each other, and we freely choose how much weight we put on them. Many identities cross national boundaries, allowing us to form transnational associations and define our “interests” across a broad geography. This flexibility and multiplicity creates room, in principle, for the establishment of a truly global political community.(The Globalization Paradox)
I suppose we are just to decide that we are of the international community and everything will be fine.
Isn’t this a version of workers of the world unite?
The thing I find curious is the theme throughout The Great Reset is that globalization and global governance is the only solution.
Yes, Klaus is pushing an agenda, but after reading Rodrik, it makes you wonder why what he says doesn’t get more press.
It’s clear Klaus isn’t happy about this when he says:
“(’hyper-globalization’ has lost all its political and social capital, and defending it is no longer politically tenable)”(113) To Klaus what Rodrik proposes “… is the only viable way to manage retreat.”(113)
To Klaus it’s either nationalization or globalization, not a medium, because the global governance that he is advocating needs nations subservient to the supra-national entity.
He seems to be convinced that global governance is “the most ‘natural’ and mitigating factor against protectionist tendencies.” (113)
Yet when we read Rodrik strong nations are what helps drive globalization, albeit a healthier version which seems to trouble Klaus in some way.
It becomes even clearer when Klaus seems to start to fear monger when he says:
“if we do not improve the functioning and legitimacy of our global institutions, the world will soon become unmanageable and very dangerous.” (113)
Does Klaus seem to think that once a nation decides what’s best for itself, there will be anarchy and war around every corner?
I fail to see how this could be the case.
He is convinced somehow that global governance is the answer because according to him “there cannot be a lasting recovery without a global strategic framework of governance.” (113)
This is obvious according to Klaus when he thinks that “… we live in a world in which nobody is in charge.” (114)
I can’t understand how Klaus can think that when there are still governments and supra-national institutions, AKA The UN.
I guess when nation-states dissolve he will have a point, but I don’t think that will happen anytime soon.
For some reason, Klaus seems to think the biggest issue facing humans is on a global scale.
I think I can speak for most that, other than an interesting topic to discuss over coffee, no one cares on any great level what happens a mile from their house.
If we did, imagine the anxiety some would have?
We can’t control everything, so why worry about everything?
He states “whether it’s pandemics, climate change, terrorism or international trade, all are global issues that we can only address, and whose risks can only be mitigated, in a collective fashion.” (115).
Yeah, I don’t buy that.
Every nation dealt with Covid by themselves, even though it was co-ordinated via the WHO.
Climate change? If you believe such a thing, but it is meaningless for any nation to reduce emissions, when the biggest polluters, ie China, India, US, and Russia, aren’t and how can you get 196 countries to agree on anything?
Terrorism? You mean the kind that is funded by governments or the kind that pops up naturally?
Terrorism, I believe, has minimal effect on the lives of everyone, so it really is a non-starter
These apparently and other big problems “take place beyond the control of even the most powerful nation states.”(115)
I can’t see how that is possible given a nation state is the epitome of power over its people?
Klaus goes on to tell us:
“… the risks and issues to be confronted are increasingly globalized, interdependent and interconnected, while the global governance capacities to do so are failing perilously, endangered by the resurgence of nationalism.”(115)
So nationalism is bad, because strong governments don’t want nationalism. Yet it’s the government who decides on the policies the country follows so the only way to combat nationalism is with better global governance? What?
I suppose if the point is to kowtow to a supra-national entity without issue then yes he is correct.
I hope everyone is beginning to see that Klaus really doesn’t want countries.
He is convinced that “without the appropriate global governance, we will become paralyzed in our attempts to address and respond to global challenges, particularly when there is such a strong dissonance between short-term domestic imperatives and long term global challenges.”(115)
I have yet to see any government not stand up to that challenge.
They may not execute particularly well, or be successful, but that doesn’t mean they can’t respond, which is what I believe Klaus is implying here.
I do recall one case, however, The USA’s response to the Rwandan genocide.
To sum up the USA’s response, it was political and that is what Klaus needs to understand, there are reasons why nations do things and reasons they do not, so who is to say the same thing won’t happen regarding global governance?
Again, the Rwandan genocide is a perfect example of a global governance failure
Klaus states that there is no committee to save the world(116) and “the general decay that Fukuyama describes in Political Order and Political Decay amplifies the problem of a world devoid of global governance.” (116)
But he fails to mention:
“Its lengthy argument can be summarised in a single sentence: without the prior establishment of a well-armed and functional territorial state, and without an independent judiciary responsible for overseeing the rule of law that robust state power then makes possible, modern liberal democracy simply cannot happen.“.
How is global governance going to happen if that isn’t in place, unless Klaus is expecting this supra-national entity to lead and be in charge of all nations?
As I read this, I really don’t think Klaus is convincing in his argument for global governance. He states:
“COVID-19 tells just such a story of failed global governance.”(116)
Yet, how did almost 196 nations magically have the same response?
Nations were getting their instructions from somewhere because I highly doubt everyone came up with the same response all by themselves in a vacuum.
Klaus feels the global governance framework that “nations could have come together to fight a global and coordinated ‘war’ against the pandemic. Instead ‘my country first’ response prevailed…” (117).
I would say rightly so.
Why shouldn’t a country that has means to create a vaccine or create products necessary to minimize risk be able to take advantage of those things first?
I don’t necessarily see a problem with that thinking, but this is the point. I shouldn’t be thinking like that.
Klaus wants global governance to dictate Who, What, Why, Where, When and How of everything and anything.
The WHO was a perfect example “it is the only organization capable of coordinating a global response to the pandemic…”(117)
Yes, we are well aware of that, and what they said should be done.
Klaus said the WHO failed, I guess you could say that, or I guess you could say they weren’t as successful as they had hoped.
It may be true that “the UN organization has no power to compel information sharing or enforce pandemic preparedness” (118)
But everyone still followed almost everything they said, so even though they may not have “real power” governments around the world still listened and obeyed.
Curious that Klaus brings up the WHO budget, $4.2 billion by the way, and tells us its “minuscule in comparison to any health budget around the world.”(118)
Yes, it’s small when you’re dealing with 196 countries, but so what?
It’s clear that nations don’t find the kind of value in the WHO that Klaus does. If it did, it would fund it more.
Klaus says “this dysfunctionality is symptomatic of a broken global governance system, and the jury is still out as to whether existing global governance configurations like the UN and the WHO can be repurposed to address today’s global risks.”(118)
Wouldn’t that mean we’ve been operating under a global governance system that is effectively impotent?
We haven’t killed ourselves yet in spite of this poor governance, so why would we need it if we are doing fine without it?
Conversely, The Colombo Declaration seems to be making its rounds around the world that doesn’t happen by accident.
So which is it, governance that is poor and dysfunctional or working?
Klaus is convinced that:
“the world will be a very dangerous place if we do not fix multilateral institutions. Global coordination will be very necessary in the aftermath… Without it we’ll be heading towards a ‘poorer, meaner, and smaller world.’”(119).
But it’s already been shown in my analysis of the economic reset that changes Klaus wants will make us poorer, meaner, and smaller.
Klaus finishes off this section with a debate regarding the increasing rivalry between China and the US, who will win and who won’t and what’s in store for us if no one wins.
Klaus basically says I don’t know, “it will oscillate between two extremes: a contained and manageable deterioration tempered by business interests at one end of the spectrum, to permanent all out hostility.”(127)
In fragile and failing nations, instability will breed chaos, which will ultimately create a new wave of mass migration.